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Abstract
In extension of the bit commitment task and following work initiated
by Cre´peau and Kilian, we introduce and solve the problem of character-
ising the optimal rate at which a discrete memoryless channel can be used
for bit commitment. It turns out that the answer is very intuitive: it is
the maximum equivocation of the channel (after removing trivial redun-
dancy), even when unlimited noiseless bidirectional side communication is
allowed. By a well–known reduction, this result provides a lower bound on
the channel’s capacity for implementing coin tossing, which we conjecture
to be an equality.
The method of proving this relates the problem to Wyner’s wire–tap
channel in an amusing way. We also discuss extensions to quantum chan-
nels.
1 Introduction
Chess masters Alice and Bob are playing for the world chess championship and,
after playing for several hours, realize that they will have to stop the game and
resume it on the next morning. However, a problem arises: if Alice plays her
turn before stopping the game, Bob will have the entire night to think of his
next move, giving him an unfair advantage. If Alice does not play, she will have
the entire night to thing of her move. How can they get out of this problem?
If there is a trusted referee, Alice can write down her move and put it into
an envelope and give it to the referee, who will announce it to Bob in the next
morning. As the referee is trusted, Alice will be unable to change her move after
writing it down, also Bob will be unable to learn Alice’s move before the next
morning. Can Alice and Bob solve this problem without the help of a trusted
referee?
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To solve these kind of problems without the use of an active trusted party,
Blum introduced commitment schemes in [7]. In a commitment scheme, Alice
commits to an information by sending some piece of information to Bob during
a commit phase. Later on, she can unveil the information she committed to
by sending some opening information to Bob during an unveiling (also called
reveal) phase. The protocol is said to be concealing if the information sent
by Alice during the commit phase does not help Bob to learn a non–negligible
amount of information on the value Alice is committing to. It is said to be
binding if Alice is unable to commit to a certain information (which is usually
a string of bits) and later on unveil a different one.
Without any kind of computational assumptions and assuming noiseless
communications, commitment schemes are impossible (see e.g. [15]; the gen-
eralisation to quantum protocols is due to Mayers [20]). Therefore, research has
mostly focused on schemes were the receiver is computationally bounded (com-
putationally concealing schemes) or schemes were the sender is computation-
ally bounded (computationally binding schemes). Examples of computationally
binding but unconditionally concealing schemes are [7], [8], [16] and [17]. Exam-
ples of computationally concealing but unconditionally binding schemes are [21]
and [23].
It is now known that noise is a powerful resource for the implementation
of cryptographic primitives: it allows for the construction of information theo-
retically secure cryptographic protocols — a task typically impossible without
the noise, and in practice done by relaxing to computational security, assuming
conjectures from complexity theory.
In his famous paper [26], Wyner was the first to exploit noise in order to
establish a secure channel in the presence of an eavesdropper. These results
were extended in studies of secret key distillation by Maurer [19], Ahlswede and
Csisza´r [1] and followers. The noise in these studies is assumed to affect the
eavesdropper: thus, to work in practice, it has to be guaranteed or certified
somehow. This might be due to some — trusted — third party who controls
the channel (and thus prevents the cryptographic parties from cheating), or due
to physical limitations, as in quantum key distribution [4, 5]. Recently, Cre´peau
and Kilian [13] showed how information theoretically secure bit commitment can
be implemented using a binary symmetric channel, their results being improved
in [12] and [15].
The object of the present study is to optimise the use of the noisy channel,
much as in Shannon’s theory of channel capacities: while the previous studies
have concentrated on the possibility of bit commitment using noisy channels,
here we look at committing to one out of a larger message set, e.g. a bit string.
We are able, for a general discrete memoryless channel, to characterise the
commitment capacity by a simple (single–letter) formula (theorem 2), stated in
section 2, and proved in two parts in sections 3 and 4. A few specific examples
are discussed in section 5 to illustrate the main result. In section 6 results on
an extension to quantum channels are related, and we close with a discussion
(section 7). An appendix collects some facts abut typical sequences used in the
main proof.
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2 Definitions and main result
In the commitment of a message there are two parties, called Alice and Bob,
the first one given the message a from a certain set A. The whole procedure
consists of two stages: first the commit phase, in which Alice (based on a) and
Bob exchange messages, according to a protocol. This will leave Bob with a
record (usually called view), to be used in the second stage, the reveal phase.
This consists of Alice disclosing a and other relevant information to Bob. Bob
performs a test on all his recorded data which accepts if Alice followed the
rules and disclosed the correct information in the second stage, and rejects if a
violation of the rules is discovered.
To be useful, such a scheme has to fulfill two requirements: it must be
“concealing” as well as “sound” and “binding”: the first property means that
after the commit phase Bob has no or almost no information about a (i.e., even
though Alice has “committed” herself to something by the communications to
Bob, this commitment remains secret), and this has to hold even if Bob does
not follow the protocol, while Alice does. Soundness means that if both parties
behave according to the protocol, Bob’s test will accept (with high probability)
after the reveal phase. The protocol to be binding means that Bob’s test is such
that whatever Alice did in the commit phase (with Bob following the rules)
there is only at most one a she can “reveal” which passes Bob’s test.
In our present consideration there is an unlimited bidirectional noiseless
channel available between Alice and Bob, and in addition a discrete memoryless
noisy channel W : X −→ Z from Alice to Bob, which may be used n times: on
input xn = x1 . . . xn, the output distribution on Zn is Wnxn =Wx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Wxn .
Definition 1 The channel W is called non–redundant, if none of its output
distributions is a convex combination of its other output distributions:
∀y∀P s.t. P (y) = 0 Wy 6=
∑
x
P (x)Wx.
In geometric terms this means that all distributions Wx are distinct extremal
points of the polytope W = conv {Wx : x ∈ X}, the convex hull of the output
distributions within the probability simplex over Z. Clearly, we can make W
into a non–redundant channel W˜ by removing all input symbols x whose output
distribution Wx is not extremal. The old channel can be simulated by the new
one, because by feeding it distributions over input symbols one can generate the
output distributions of the removed symbols.
The channel W is called trivial, if after making it non–redundant its output
distributions have mutually disjoint support. This means that from the output
one can infer the input with certainty.
With this we can pass to a formal definition of a protocol: this, consisting
of the named two stages, involves creation on Alice’s side of either messages
intended for the noiseless channel, or inputs to the noisy channel, based on
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previous messages receive from Bob via the noiseless channel, which themselves
are based on data received before, etc. Both agents may employ probabilistic
choices, which we model by Alice and Bob each using a random variable,M and
N , respectively. This allows them to use deterministic functions in the protocol.
Note that this makes all messages sent and received into well-defined random
variables, dependent on a.
Commit Phase: The protocol goes for r rounds of Alice–to–Bob and Bob–to–
Alice noiseless communications Uj and Vj . After round ri (r1 ≤ . . . ≤ rn ≤ r)
Alice will also send a symbol Xi down the noisy channel W , which Bob receives
as Zi. Setting r0 = 0 and rn+1 = r:
Round ri + k (1 ≤ k ≤ ri+1 − ri): Alice sends U ri+k = fri+k
(
a,M, V ri+k−1
)
noiselessly. Bob answers Vri+k = gri+k
(
Zi, N, U ri+k
)
, also noiselessly. After
round ri and before round ri + 1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n), Alice sends Xi = Fi
(
a,M, V ri
)
,
which Bob receives as Zi =W (Xi).
Reveal Phase: A similar procedure as the Commit Phase, but without the noisy
channel uses, including Alice’s sending a to Bob. At the end of the exchange
Bob performs a test as to whether to accept Alice’s behaviour or not. It is
easily seen that this procedure can be simulated by Alice simply telling Bob a
and M , after which Bob performs his test β
(
Zn, N, U r; a,M
) ∈ {ACC,REJ}.
I.e., requiring Alice to revealM and amakes cheating for her only more difficult.
We shall, for technical reasons, impose the condition that the range of the
variable U r is bounded: ∣∣U r∣∣ ≤ exp(Bn), (1)
with a constant B. Note that exp and log in this paper are always to basis 2,
unless otherwise stated.
Now, the mathematical form of the conditions for concealing as well as for
soundness and binding is this: we call the above protocol ǫ–concealing if for any
two messages a, a′ ∈ A and any behaviour of Bob during the commit phase,
1
2
∥∥Distra(ZnNU r)−Distra′(ZnNU r)∥∥1 ≤ ǫ, (A)
where Distra(Z
nNU r) is the distribution of the random variables ZnNU r after
completion of the commit phase which Alice entered with the message a and the
randomnessM , and with the ℓ1–norm ‖ ·‖1; the above expression is identical to
the total variational distance of the distributions. This is certainly the strongest
requirement one could wish for: it says that no statistical test of Bob immedi-
ately after the commit phase can distinguish between a and a′ with probability
larger than ǫ. Note that V r is a function of ZnNU r, and hence could be left out
in eq. (A). Assuming any probability distribution on the messages, a is the value
of a random variable A, and it is jointly distributed with all other variables of
the protocol. Then, whatever Bob’s strategy,
I
(
A ∧ ZnNU r) ≤ ǫ′ = H(2ǫ, 1− 2ǫ) + 2nǫ(logB + log |Z|), (A’)
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where
I(X ∧ Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(XY )
is the (Shannon) mutual information between X and Y , and
H(X) = −
∑
x
Pr{X = x} log Pr{X = x}
is the (Shannon) entropy of X [25].
We call the protocol δ–sound and –binding (δ–binding for short), if for Alice
and Bob following the protocol, for all a ∈ A,
Pr
{
β
(
ZnNU r; aM
)
= ACC
} ≥ 1− δ, (B1)
and, whatever Alice does during the commit phase, governed by a random
variable S with values σ (which determines the distribution of ZnNU r), for all
A = a(S, V r), A′ = a′(S, V r), M˜ = µ(S, V r) and M˜ ′ = µ′(S, V r) such that
A 6= A′ with probability 1,
Pr
{
β
(
ZnNU r;AM˜
)
= ACC & β
(
ZnNU r;A′M˜ ′
)
= ACC
}
≤ δ. (B2)
Note that by convexity the cheating attempt of Alice is w.l.o.g. deterministic,
which is to say that S takes on only one value σ with non-zero probability, hence
Pr{S = σ} = 1.
We call 1
n
log |A| the (commitment) rate of the protocol. A rate R is said
to be achievable if there exist commitment protocols for every n with rates
converging to R, which are ǫ–concealing and δ–binding with ǫ, δ → 0 as n→∞.
The commitment capacity Ccom(W ) of W is the supremum of all achievable
rates.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem:
Theorem 2 The commitment capacity of the discrete channel W (assumed to
be non–redundant) is
Ccom(W ) = max
{
H(X |Z) : X,Z RVs, Distr(Z|X) =W},
i.e., the maximal equivocation of the channel over all possible input distribu-
tions.
Corollary 3 Every non–trivial discrete memoryless channel can be used to per-
form bit commitment. ✷
By invoking the well–known reduction of coin tossing to bit commitment [7] we
obtain:
Corollary 4 The channel W can be used for secure two–party coin tossing
at rate at least Ccom(W ). I.e., for the naturally defined coin tossing capacity
Cc.t.(W ), one has Cc.t.(W ) ≥ Ccom(W ). ✷
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This theorem will be proved in the following two sections (propositions 8 and 9):
first we construct a protocol achieving the equivocation bound, showing that
exponential decrease of ǫ and δ is possible, and without using the noiseless side
channels at all during the commit phase. Then we show the optimality of the
bound.
To justify our allowing small errors both in the concealing and the binding
property of a protocol, we close this section by showing that demanding too
much trivialises the problem:
Theorem 5 There is no bit–commitment via W which is ǫ–concealing and 0–
binding with ǫ < 1. I.e., not even two distinct messages can be committed:
|A| = 1.
Proof. If the protocol is 0–sound, this means that for every value µ attained by
M with positive probability, Bob will accept the reveal phase if Alice behaved
according to the protocol. On the other hand, that the protocol is 0–binding
means that for a 6= a′ and arbitrary µ′, Bob will never accept if Alice behaves
according to the protocol in the commit phase, with values aµ but tries to
“reveal” a′µ′. This opens the possibility of a decoding method for a based on
ZnNU r: Bob simply tries out all possible aµ with his test β — the single a
which is accepted must be the one used by Alice. Hence the scheme cannot be
ǫ–concealing with ǫ < 1. ✷
Remark 6 By contrast, is is easy to construct schemes both 0–concealing and
δ-binding with δ < 1, for an appropriately defined channel:
Consider the channel F with input and output alphabets X = Z = {0, 1, 2, 3}
and signals defined by
Fx(z) =
{
1
2 if z − x ≡ 0 or 1 mod 4,
0 otherwise.
Alice commits to the bit b by picking c ∈ {0, 1} at random and sending x = b+2c
(for which Bob receives a random z such that z−x ≡ 0 or 1 mod 4). To reveal,
she tells him x (which decodes to a unique b) and he accepts iff z − x ≡ 0 or 1
mod 4.
Cleary, this scheme is 0–concealing because for both b = 0 and b = 1 Bob sees
the uniform distribution on Z. Equally obviously, it is 0–sound, but it is also
1
2–binding: for if Alice wants to “reveal” b
′ 6= b (with corresponding x′ 6= x),
she has only a probability of 12 to pick x
′ with z − x′ ≡ 0 or 1 mod 4.
This simple scheme is in fact the template for the coding scheme of propo-
sition 8: put differently, on sufficiently large scale (block length) every channel
looks like F .
3 A scheme meeting the equivocation bound
Here we describe and prove security bounds of a scheme which is very simple
compared to the generality we allowed in section 4: in the commit phase it
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consists only of a single block use of the noisy channel Wn, with no public
discussion at all, where the input Xn is a random one–to–many function of a
(in particular, a is a function of the xn chosen). In the reveal phase Alice simply
announces Xn to Bob.
Proposition 7 Given σ, τ > 0, and a distribution P of X ∈ X , with the output
Z =W (X), Q = Distr(Z). Then there exists a collection of codewords(
ξaµ ∈ Xn : a = 1, . . . ,K, µ = 1, . . . , L
)
with the following properties:
1. For all (a, µ) 6= (a′, µ′), dH(ξaµ, ξa′µ′) ≥ 2σn.
2. For every a:
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L
L∑
µ=1
Wnξaµ −Q⊗n
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 25|X ||Z| exp(−nτ).
3. There are constants G,G′ and a continuous function G′′ vanishing at 0
such that
K ≥ 1
2n
(3 + log |X |+ log |Z|)−1 exp(nH(X |Z)− n√2τG′ − nG′′(σ)),
L ≤ n(3 + log |X |+ log |Z|) exp(nI(X ∧ Z) + n√2τG).
Proof. To get the idea, imagine a wiretap channel [26] with W as the stochastic
matrix of the eavesdropper and a symmetric channel Sσ : X −→ Y = X for the
legal user:
Sσ(y|x) =
{
1− σ if x = y,
1
|X |σ if x 6= y.
The random coding strategy for such a channel, according to Wyner’s solu-
tion [26] (but see also [14] and [10]) will produce a code with the properties 2
and 3. Because the code for the legal user must fight the noise of the symmet-
ric channel Sσ, we can expect its codewords to be of large mutual Hamming
distance, i.e., we should get property 1.
In detail: pick the ξaµ i.i.d. according to the distribution P˜
n, which is 0
outside T n
P,
√
2τ
(the typical sequences, see appendix A) and P⊗n within, suitably
normalised. Also introduce the subnormalised measures Ŵnxn : this is identical to
Wnxn within T nW,√2τ (xn) and 0 outside. We will show that with high probability
we can select codewords with properties 2 and 3, and only a small proportion of
which violate property 1; then by an expurgation argument will we obtain the
desired code.
By eqs. (9) and (14) in the appendix we have
1
2
∥∥∥EŴnξaµ −Q⊗n∥∥∥ ≤ 3|X ||Z| exp(−nτ), (2)
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with the expectation referring to the distribution P˜n of the ξaµ. Observe that
the support of all Ŵnξaµ is contained in T nQ,2|X |√τ , using eq. (18) of the appendix.
Now, S is defined as the set of those zn for which
EŴnξaµ(z
n) ≥ T := exp(−nτ) exp(−nH(Q)− n√2τ |X |F ),
with F =
∑
z:Q(z) 6=0− logQ(z), and define W˜nxn(zn) = Ŵnxn(zn) if zn ∈ S and
0 otherwise. With the cardinality estimate eq. (11) of the appendix and eq. (2)
we obtain
1
2
∥∥∥EW˜nξaµ −Q⊗n∥∥∥ ≤ 4|X ||Z| exp(−nτ). (3)
The Chernoff bound allows us now to efficiently sample the expectation Q˜n :=
EW˜nξaµ : observe that all the values of W˜
n
ξaµ
are upper bounded by
t := exp
(−nH(W |P ) + n√2τ |X | log |Z|+ n√2τE),
using eq. (15). Thus, rescaling the variables, by lemma 13 and with the union
bound, we get
Pr
∀a∀zn ∈ S 1L′
L′∑
µ=1
W˜nξaµ(z
n) ∈ [(1± exp(−nτ))Q˜n(zn)]

≤ 2K|S| exp
(
−LT
t
exp(−2nτ)
2 ln 2
)
,
(4)
which is smaller than 1/2 if
L′ > 2 + n(log |X |+ log |Z|) exp(nI(X ∧ Z) + n√2τG),
with G = 3 + |X |F + |X | log |Z|+ E. Note that in this case, there exist values
for the ξaµ such that the averages
1
L′
∑
µW
n
ξaµ
are close to Q⊗n.
Now we have to enforce property 1: in a random batch of ξaµ we call aµ bad
if ξaµ has Hamming distance less than 2σn from another ξa′µ′ . The probability
that aµ is bad is easily bounded:
Pr{aµ bad} ≤ 2|X | exp(−nτ) + P⊗n
 ⋃
a′µ′ 6=aµ
B2nσ(ξa′µ′)

≤ 2|X | exp(−nτ) + max
{
P⊗n(A) : |A| ≤ K ′L′
(
n
2nσ
)
|X |2nσ
}
≤ 5|X | exp(−nτ),
by eq. (13) in the appendix, because we choose
K ′ ≤ 1
n
(3 + log |X |+ log |Z|)−1
exp
(
nH(X |Z)− n
√
2τG− 2n
√
2τD − nH(2σ, 1− 2σ)− 2nσ log |X |),
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hence
K ′L′
(
n
2nσ
)
|X |2nσ < exp(nH(P )− 2n√2τD).
Thus, with probability at least 1/2, only a fraction of 10|X | exp(−nτ) of the aµ
are bad. Putting this together with eq. (4), we obtain a selection of ξaµ such
that
∀a 1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ 1L′ ∑
µ
Wnξaµ −Q⊗n
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 5|X ||Z| exp(−nτ) (5)
and only a fraction of 10|X | exp(−nτ) of the aµ are bad.
This means that for at least half of the a, w.l.o.g. a = 1, . . . ,K = K ′/2, only a
fraction 20|X | exp(−nτ) of the µ form bad pairs aµ, w.l.o.g. for µ = L+1, . . . , L′,
with L =
(
1 − 20|X | exp(−nτ))L′. Throwing out the remaining a and the bad
µ, we are left with a code as desired. ✷
Observe that a receiver of Zn can efficiently check claims about the input ξaµ
because of property 1, that distinct codewords have “large” Hamming distance.
The non–redundancy of W shuns one–sided errors in this checking, as we shall
see. The test β is straightforward: it accepts iff ZN ∈ T n
W,
√
2τ
(ξaµ), the set of
conditional typical sequences, see appendix A. This ensures soundness; for the
bindingness we refer to the following proof.
We are now in a position to describe a protocol, having chosen codewords
according to proposition 7:
Commit phase: To commit to a message a, Alice picks µ ∈ {1, . . . , L}
uniformly at random and sends ξaµ through the channel. Bob ob-
tains a channel output zn.
Reveal phase: Alice announces a and µ. Bob performs the test β:
he accepts if zn ∈ Baµ := T nW,√2τ (ξaµ) and rejects otherwise.
Proposition 8 Assume that for all x ∈ X and distributions P with P (x) = 0,∥∥∥∥∥Wx −∑
y
P (y)Wy
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ η.
Let τ = σ
4η2
8|X |4|Z|2 : then the above protocol implements an ǫ–concealing and δ–
binding commitment with rate
1
n
logK ≥ H(X |Z)−
√
2τG′ −H(2σ, 1− 2σ)− 2σ log |X | − logn
n
−O
(
1
n
)
and exponentially bounded security parameters:
ǫ = 50|X ||Z| exp(−nτ),
δ = 2|X ||Z| exp(−2nτ2).
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Proof. That the protocol is ǫ–concealing is obvious from property 2 of the code
in proposition 7: Bob’s distribution of Zn is always ǫ/2-close to Q⊗n, whatever
a is.
To show δ–bindingness observe first that if Alice is honest, sending ξaµ in the
commit phase and later revealing aµ, the test β will accept with high probability:
Pr
{
Zn ∈ Baµ
}
=Wnξaµ
(T n
W,
√
2τ
(ξaµ)
)
≥ 1− 2|X ||Z| exp(−nτ) ≥ 1− δ,
by eq. (14) in the appendix.
On the other hand, if Alice cheats, we may — in accordance with our defini-
tion — assume her using a deterministic strategy: i.e., she “commits” sending
some xn and later attempts to “reveal” either aµ or a′µ′, with a 6= a′. Because
of property 1 of the code in proposition 7, at least one of the codewords ξaµ,
ξa′µ′ is at Hamming distance at least σn from x
n: w.l.o.g., the former of the
two. But then the test β accepts “revelation” of aµ with small probability:
Pr
{
Zn ∈ Baµ
}
=Wnxn
(T n
W,
√
2τ
(ξaµ)
) ≤ 2 exp(−2nτ2) ≤ δ,
by lemma 14 in the appendix. ✷
4 Upper bounding the achievable rate
We assume that W is non–redundant. We shall prove the following assertion,
assuming a uniformly distributed variable A ∈ A of messages.
Proposition 9 Consider an ǫ–concealing and δ–binding commitment protocol
with n uses of W . Then
log |A| ≤nmax{H(X |Z) : Distr(Z|X) =W}
+ n
(
ǫ(logB + log |Z|) + 5 3
√
δ log |X |)+ 2. (6)
The key, as it turns out, of its proof, is the insight that in the above protocol,
should it be concealing and binding, xn together with Bob’s view of the commit
phase (essentially) determine a. In the more general formulation we permitted
in section 2, we prove :
H(A|ZnNU r;Xn) ≤ δ′ = H
(
5
3
√
δ, 1− 5 3
√
δ
)
+ 5
3
√
δ log |A|. (B’)
Intuitively, this means that with the items Alice entered into the commit phase
of the protocol and those which are accessible to Bob, not too many values of
A should be consistent — otherwise Alice had a way to cheat.
Proof of eq. (B’). For each aµ the commit protocol (both players being honest)
creates a distribution ∆aµ over conversations (x
nvr; znur). We leave out Bob’s
random variable N here, noting that he can create its correct conditional dis-
tribution from znur; vr, which is his view of the conversation. The only other
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place where he needs it is to perform the test β. We shall in the following
assume that it includes this creation of N , which makes β into a probabilistic
test, depending on (aµvr; znur).
The pair aµ has a probability αaµ that its conversation with subsequent
revelation of aµ is accepted. By soundness, we have∑
µ
Pr{M = µ}αaµ ≥ 1− δ,
for every a. Hence, by Markov inequality, there exists (for every a) a set of µ of
total probability ≥ 1− 3
√
δ2 for which αaµ ≥ 1− 3
√
δ. We call such µ good for a.
From this we get a set Caµ of “partial” conversations (xnvr;ur), with proba-
bility ∆aµ
(Caµ) ≥ 1− 3√δ, which are accepted with probability at least 1− 3√δ.
(In the test also Zn enters, which is distributed according to Wnxn .)
Let us now define the set
Ca :=
⋃
µ good for a
Caµ,
which is a set of “partial conversations” which are accepted with probability at
least 1− 3
√
δ and
∆a
(Ca) ≥ 1− 2 3√δ,
with the distribution
∆a :=
∑
µ
Pr{M = µ}∆aµ
over “partial conversations”: it is the distribution created by the commit phase
give the message a.
We claim that
∆a
XnV r;U r ∈ ⋃
a′ 6=a
Ca′
 ≤ 3 3√δ. (7)
Indeed, if this were not the case, Alice had the following cheating strategy: in
the commit phase she follows the protocol for input message a. In the reveal
phase she looks at the “partial conversation” xnvr;ur and tries to “reveal”
some a′µ′ for which the partial conversation is in Ca′µ′ (if these do not exist,
a′µ′ is arbitrary). This defines random variables A′ and M˜ ′ for which it is easily
checked that
Pr
{
β(ZnNU r; aM) = ACC & β(ZnNU r;A′M˜ ′) = ACC
}
> δ,
contradicting the δ–bindingness condition.
Using eq. (7) we can build a decoder for A from XnV r;U r: choose Â = a
such that XnV r;U r ∈ Ca — if there exists none or more than one, let Â be
arbitrary. Clearly,
Pr{A 6= Â} ≤ 5 3
√
δ,
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and invoking Fano’s inequality we are done. ✷
Armed with this, we can now proceed to the
Proof of proposition 9. We can successively estimate,
H(Xn|Zn) ≥ H(Xn|ZnNU r)
= H(AXn|ZnNU r)−H(A|ZnNU r;Xn)
≥ H(A|ZnNU r)−H(A|ZnNU r;Xn)
≥ H(A|ZnNU r)− δ′
= H(A)− I(A ∧ ZnNU r)− δ′
≥ H(A)− ǫ′ − δ′,
using eq. (B’) in the fourth, eq. (A’) in the sixth line. On the other hand,
subadditivity and the conditioning inequality imply
H(Xn|Zn) ≤
n∑
k=1
H(Xk|Zk),
yielding the claim, because H(A) = log |A|.
The application to the proof of the converse of theorem 2 is by observing
that ǫ′, δ′ = o(n). ✷
Note that for the proof of the proposition we considered only a very weak
attempt of Alice to cheat: she behaves according to the protocol during the
commit phase, and only at the reveal stage she tries to be inconsistent. Similarly,
our concealingness condition considered only passive attempts to cheat by Bob,
i.e., he follows exactly the protocol, and tries to extract information about A
only by looking at his view of the exchange.
Thus, even in the model of passive cheating, which is less restrictive than
our definition in section 2, we obtain the upper bound of proposition 9
5 Examples
In this section we discuss some particular channels, which we present as stochas-
tic matrices with the rows containing the output distributions.
1. Binary symmetric channel Bp: Let 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Define
Bp :=
· 0 1
0 1− p p
1 p 1− p
The transmission capacity if this channel is easily computed from Shannon’s
formula [25]: C(Bp) = 1 − H(p, 1 − p), which is non–zero iff p 6= 1/2. The
optimal input distribution is the uniform distribution (1/2, 1/2) on {0, 1}. Note
that this channel is trivial if p ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}, hence Ccom(Bp) = 0 for these
values of p. We may thus, w.l.o.g., assume that 0 < p < 1/2, for which Bp is
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non–redundant. It is not hard to compute the optimal input distribution as the
uniform distribution, establishing Ccom(Bp) = H(p, 1− p).
The result is in accordance with our intuition: the noisier the channel is, the
worse it is for transmission, but the better for commitment.
2. A trivial channel: Consider the channel
T :=
· 0 1
a 1/2 1/2
b 1 0
c 0 1
Clearly, T is trivial, hence Ccom(T ) = 0. Still it is an interesting example in
the light of our proof of proposition 8: for assume a wiretap channel for which
T is the stochastic matrix of the eavesdropper, while the legal user obtains a
noiseless copy of the input. Then clearly the wiretap capacity of this system is
1, with optimal input distribution (1/2, 1/4, 1/4).
3. Transmission and commitment need not be opposites: We show here
an example of a channel where the optimising input distributions for transmis-
sion and for commitment are very different:
V :=
· 0 1
0 1/2 1/2
1 1 0
It can be easily checked that the maximum of the mutual information, i.e. the
transmission capacity, is attained for the input distribution
P (0) =
2
5
= 0.4, P (1) =
3
5
= 0.6,
from which we obtain C(V ) ≈ 0.3219. On the other hand, the equivocation is
maximised for the input distribution
P ′(0) = 1−
√
1
5
≈ 0.5528, P ′(1) =
√
1
5
≈ 0.4472,
from which we get that Ccom(V ) ≈ 0.6942. The maximising distributions are so
different that the sum C(V ) +Ccom(V ) > 1, i.e. it exceeds the maximum input
and output entropies of the channel.
6 Quantum channels
The construction of section 3 can be carried over to a class of quantum channels,
namely so–called cq–channels (classical–quantum channels):
W : X −→ S(H),
a map from an input alphabet (here assumed to be finite) into the set of states
on a Hilbert space H, also assumed to be finite–dimensional in the present
discussion. (For an overview of quantum information theory see [6] and the
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textbook [22].) Non–redundancy means the same here, only that the convex
structure is now the convex compact set of states, instead of the probability
simplex. We assume this property of W silently in the following.
Theorem 10 For a distribution P on the input alphabet, one can achieve the
commitment rate
H(P )− χ({P (x);Wx}), (8)
with the Holevo mutual information [18]
χ
({P (x);Wx}) = S(∑
x
P (x)Wx
)
−
∑
x
P (x)S(Wx),
where S(ρ) = −Trρ log ρ is the von Neumann entropy of a state.
The maximum of the expression (8) is optimal in the case of no noiseless
side communication during the commit phase.
Proof (Sketch). For the achievability one proves a coding result similar to
proposition 7, with the ‖ · ‖1–norm denoting trace norm. The most crucial
point is property 2: our proof used two things: restricting the distributions
Wnxn to typical sequences — this can be done also for states by constructing
typical subspaces — and Chernoff bound to obtain a “small sample”. We use
an analogue of this for operators from [2], stated below as lemma 11. This
technique is actually used in the work of Cai and Yeung [10] to construct codes
for the quantum wiretap channel
For the optimality, it is not hard to prove the quantum analogues of eqs. (A’)
and (B’), and then the upper bound follows exactly as in our proof of proposi-
tion 9. ✷
Lemma 11 (Ahlswede, Winter [2]) Let X1, . . . , XL be i.i.d. random vari-
ables taking values in the operators B(H) on the D–dimensional Hilbert space
H, 0 ≤ Xℓ ≤ 1 , with A = EXℓ ≥ α1 , and let η > 0. Then
Pr
{
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
Xℓ 6∈ [(1− η)A; (1 + η)A]
}
≤ 2D exp
(
−L αη
2
2 ln 2
)
,
where [A;B] = {X : A ≤ X ≤ B} is an interval in the operator order. ✷
Example 12 Assume any set of distinct pure qubit states Wx = |ψx〉〈ψx|.
Then, with ρ =
∑
x P (x)Wx, the rate
max
P
{H(P )− S(ρ)}
is achievable. Because of S(ρ) ≤ 1 this is positive if the input alphabet has at
least three symbols; in the case of two input symbols it is positive iff the two
states are non–orthogonal.
This is no contradiction to Mayer’s no–go theorem for quantum bit commit-
ment even though the channel might appear to be noiseless: it is, however, not a
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noiseless qubit channel, because the states are restricted to a set of pure states.
Modelled as a completely positive map, it would be a measurement–prepare
channel of the form
W : B(CX ) −→ B(H)
σ 7−→
∑
x
〈x|σ|x〉Wx.
I.e., its use involves a “guaranteed (von Neumann) measurement” on all mes-
sages which come from Alice.
Regarding theorem 10, we conjecture the achievable rate stated there to
remain optimal even if unlimited noiseless quantum communication is allowed.
There is however the much more interesting question of more general quantum
channels, for example a depolarising qubit channel, the quantum analogue of a
binary symmetric channel: does it allow bit commitment, and if so, at which
rate?
This generalisation may be significant because first of all, information theo-
retically secure bit commitment is not possible with noiseless quantum commu-
nication [20]. Here we have shown that it is possible under the assumption of
a noisy channel. This opens the possibility of perhaps having bit commitment
under realistic conditions where one can ensure that all available channels are
noisy.
7 Discussion
We have considered bit–string commitment by using a noisy channel and have
characterised the exact capacity for this task by a single–letter formula. This
implies a lower bound on the coin tossing capacity of that channel by the same
formula, which in fact we conjecture to be an equality.
Satisfactory as this result is, it has to be noted that we are not able in
general to provide an explicit protocol: our proof is based on the random coding
technique and shows only existence. What is more, even if one finds a good
code it will most likely be inefficient: the codebook is just the list of ξaµ. In
this connection we conjecture that the commitment capacity can be achieved
by random linear codes (compare the situation for channel coding!). It is in any
case an open problem to find efficient good codes, even for the binary symmetric
channel. Note that we only demand efficient encoding — there is no decoding
of errors in our scheme, only an easily performed test.
Our scheme is a block–coding method: Alice has to know the whole of her
message, say a bit string, before she can encode. One might want to use our
result as a building block in other protocols which involve committing to bits at
various stages — then the natural question arises whether there is an “online”
version which would allow Alice to encode and send bits as she goes along.
In the same direction of better applicability it would be desirable to extend
our results to a more robust notion of channel: compare the work of [15] where
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a cheater is granted partial control over the channel characteristics. Still, the
fixed channel is not beyond application: note that it can be simulated by pre–
distributed data from a trusted party via a “noisy one–time pad” (compare [3]
and [24]).
Another open question of interest is to determine the reliability function,
i.e., the optimal asymptotic rate of the error ǫ + δ (note that implicit in our
proposition 8 is a lower bound): it is especially interesting at R = 0, because
there the rate tells exactly how secure single–bit commitment can be made.
Finally, we have outlined that a class of quantum channels also allows bit
commitment: they even have a commitment capacity of the same form as the
classical result. This opens up the possibility of unconditionally secure bit
commitment for other noisy quantum channels.
We hope that our work will stimulate the search for optimal rates of other
cryptographic primitives, some of which are possible based on noise, e.g. obliv-
ious transfer.
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A Typical sequences
This appendix collects some facts about typical sequences used in the main body
of the text. We follow largely the book of Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [14].
The fundamental fact we shall use is the following large deviation version of
the law of large numbers:
Lemma 13 (Chernoff [11]) For i.i.d. random variables X1, . . . , XN , with 0 ≤
Xn ≤ 1 and with expectation EXn = p:
Pr
{
1
N
N∑
n=1
Xn ≥ (1 + η)p
}
≤ exp
(
−N pη
2
2 ln 2
)
,
Pr
{
1
N
N∑
n=1
Xn ≤ (1− η)p
}
≤ exp
(
−N pη
2
2 ln 2
)
.
✷
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For a probability distribution P on X and ǫ > 0 define the set of ǫ–typical
sequences:
T nP,ǫ =
{
xn : ∀x
∣∣N(x|xn)− P (x)n∣∣ ≤ ǫn & P (x) = 0⇒ N(x|xn) = 0} ,
with the number N(x|xn) denoting the number of letters x in the word xn. The
probability distribution Pxn(x) =
1
n
N(x|xn) is called the type of xn. Note that
xn ∈ T nP,ǫ is equivalent to |Pxn(x)− P (x)| ≤ ǫ for all x.
These are the properties of typical sequences we shall need:
P⊗n
(T nP,ǫ) ≥ 1− 2|X | exp(−nǫ2/2). (9)
This is an easy consequence of the Chernoff bound, lemma 13, applied to the
indicator variables Xk of the letter x in position k in X
n, with η = ǫP (x)−1.
∀xn ∈ T nP,ǫ
{
P⊗n(xn) ≤ exp(−nH(P ) + nǫD),
P⊗n(xn) ≥ exp(−nH(P )− nǫD), (10)
with the constant D =
∑
x:P (x) 6=0− logP (x). See [14].∣∣T nP,ǫ∣∣ ≤ exp(nH(P ) + nǫD), (11)∣∣T nP,ǫ∣∣ ≥ (1− 2|X | exp(−nǫ2/2)) exp(nH(P )− nǫD). (12)
This follows from eq. (10). These estimates also allow to lower bound the size
of sets with large probability: assume P⊗n(C) ≥ η, then
|C| ≥
(
η − 2|X | exp(−nǫ2/2)) exp(nH(P )− nǫD). (13)
We also use these notions in the “non–stationary” case: consider a channel
W : X −→ Z, and an input string xn ∈ Xn. Then define, with ǫ > 0, the set of
conditional ǫ–typical sequences:
T nW,ǫ(xn) =
{
zn : ∀x, z
∣∣N(xz|xnzn)− nW (z|x)Pxn(x)∣∣ ≤ ǫn
& W (z|x) = 0⇒ N(xz|xnzn) = 0
}
=
∏
x
T Ix
Wx,ǫPxn(x)
−1 ,
with the sets Ix of positions in the word xn where xk = x. The latter product
representation allows to easily transport all of the above relations for typical
sequences to conditional typical sequences:
Wnxn
(T nW,ǫ(xn)) ≥ 1− 2|X ||Z| exp(−nǫ2/2). (14)
∀xn ∈ T nW,ǫ(xn)
{
Wnxn(x
n) ≤ exp(−nH(W |Pxn) + nǫE),
Wnxn(x
n) ≥ exp(−nH(W |Pxn)− nǫE), (15)
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with E = maxx
∑
z:Wx(z) 6=0− logWx(z) and the conditional entropyH(W |P ) =∑
x P (x)H(Wx).∣∣T nW,ǫ(xn)∣∣ ≤ exp(nH(W |Pxn) + nǫE), (16)∣∣T nW,ǫ(xn)∣∣ ≥ (1− 2|X ||Z| exp(−nǫ2/2)) exp(nH(W |Pxn)− nǫE). (17)
A last elementary property: for xn of type P and output distribution Q, with
Q(z) =
∑
x P (x)Wx(z),
T nW,ǫ(xn) ⊂ T nQ,ǫ|X |. (18)
As an application, let us prove the following lemma:
Lemma 14 For words xn and yn with dH(x
n, yn) ≥ σn, and a channel W such
that
∀x ∈ X , P p.d. with P (x) = 0
∥∥∥∥∥Wx −∑
y
P (y)Wy
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ η,
one has, with ǫ = σ
2η
2|X |2|Z| ,
Wnyn
(T nW,ǫ(xn)) ≤ 2 exp(−nǫ4/2)
Proof. There exists an x such that the word xIx (composed of letters x only) has
distance at least 1|X |σn from y
Ix . In particular, Nx := N(x|xn) = |Ix| ≥ 1|X |σn.
This implies also, by assumption on the channel,∥∥∥∥∥ 1Nx ∑
k∈Ix
Wyk −Wx
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ 1|X |ση.
Hence there must be a z ∈ Z with∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nx ∑
k∈Ix
Wyk(z)−Wx(z)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 1|X ||Z|ση.
By definition, this in turn implies that for all zn ∈ T nW,ǫ(xn),∣∣∣∣∣N (z|zIx)− ∑
k∈Ix
Wyk(z)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 12|X ||Z|σηNx.
Introducing the sets Jxy = {k ∈ Ix : yk = y}, with cardinalities Nxy = |Iyx|,
there is a y such that (still for all zn ∈ T nW,ǫ(xn)),∣∣N (z|zJxy)−NxyWy(z)∣∣ ≥ 1
2|X |2|Z|σηNx
≥ 1
2|X |2|Z|σηNxy.
This implies
Nxy ≥ 1
4|X |2|Z|σηNx ≥
1
4|X |3|Z|σ
2ηn,
and with lemma 13 we obtain the claim. ✷
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